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UNITED STATES v. MacDONALD*
There is a consensus in this country that drug use is among
the most serious domestic problems plaguing the nation. In fact,
all levels of the United States government have declared a "war
on drugs." Commentators have suggested that the "war on
drugs" has had the effect of narrowing Fourth Amendment1 pro-
tections for suspected drug criminals.2 United States v. Mac-
* 916 F.2d 766 (2d Cir. 1990) (in banc), vacating United States v. Thomas, 893 F.2d
482 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1071 (1991).
1 US. CONST. amend. IV provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fects against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause supported by oath and affirma-
tion and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
2 See, e.g., Saltzburg, Another Victim of Illegal Narcotics: The Fourth Amendment
(As Illustrated by the Open Fields Doctrine), 48 U. Prrr. L. Rey. 1, 2-3 (1986) (Salzburg
suggests that the Fourth Amendment is a victim of the "war on drugs" in that Fourth
Amendment protections suffer as the courts struggle to assist the other branches of gov-
ernment in the "war." Salzburg criticizes judges who "shade their eyes to avoid the limi-
tations on law enforcement imposed by the Bill of Rights." He warns that "[flew consti-
tutional doctrines can be confined to drug cases, and judicial toleration of improper
practices thus cannot be reserved for these cases."). See also Wisotshy, Crackdown: The
Emerging "Drug Exception" to the Bill of Rights, 38 HASrlGs L.J. 889, 905-06 (1987):
In the past three or four decades, [people whose constitutional rights] were
damaged by legislative or prosecutorial excesses could generally turn to the
federal courts for protection. But the War on Drugs steamroller has flattened
judicial activism. The Constitution's pivotal, even mythological place in our
national consciousness is rapidly being eroded by a positivist, bureaucratic at-
titude that we can - must - do whatever is deemed necessary or expedient in
waging the War on Drugs.
See also LaFave, Fourth Amendment Vagaries (Of Improbable Cause, Imperceptible
Plain View, Notorious Privacy, and Balancing Askew), 74 J. CU .& CIMOLOGY
1171, 1223-24 (1983) (suggesting that the negative effects of drug trafficking may produce
"atrophy in the fourth amendment").
Members of the judiciary also have warned against the evolving drug exception. See
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' As'n, 489 U.S. 602, 614 (1989) ("there is no drug
exception to the Constitution, any more than there is a communism exception or an
exception for other real or imagined sources of domestic unrest"); United States v. Karo,
468 U.S. 705, 717 (1984) ('[those] suspected of drug offenses are no less entitled to
[Fourth Amendment] protection than those suspected of nondrug offenses").
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Donald' is a further indication that the judiciary is abandoning
traditional Fourth Amendment safeguards in return for more ef-
ficient law enforcement. A close analysis of this case reveals a
lack of sensitivity to core Fourth Amendment values when nar-
cotics violations are at issue.
In United States v. MacDonald the Second Circuit under-
mined the warrant requirement for home entries when the police
have probable cause to believe that narcotics trafficking is tran-
spiring in a home. In MacDonald drug enforcement agents re-
ceived a tip indicating that a drug trafficking business was oper-
ating out of an apartment.4 Four months after receiving the tip,
the agents set up a surveillance operation to investigate the alle-
gation.5 After observing a steady stream of individuals enter and
exit the apartment, an undercover agent gained entry and
bought a small quantity of drugs with a prerecorded five dollar
bill.8 While inside the apartment, the officer saw two weapons,
piles of money, and a large quantity of what appeared to be
drugs. The undercover agent did not recognize any of the indi-
viduals inside the apartment nor did they recognize him.7 More-
over, the agent saw no security devices, lookouts or runners that
would indicate that the suspects were alerted to the surveillance
team's presence.8
Without discussing the possibility of obtaining a warrant, a
group of officers reentered the apartment building and knocked
on the suspects' door, ostensibly to obtain a consent for a war-
rantless search.9 Immediately after identifying themselves as po-
lice officers, they heard the sound of shuffling feet and received a
3 916 F.2d 766 (2d Cir. 1990) (in banc).
4 Id. at 768.
6Id.
I Government agents often use "prerecorded" money in undercover drug operations.
Agents record the serial numbers of the money, use the money to buy contraband, and.
try to recover the money at the time of the arrest. The prerecorded money will then be
offered as evidence at trial.
United States v. Thomas, 893 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1990) (panel).
'Id. Drug traffickers often use a range of procedures and devices to shield them-
selves from arrest. For example, they monitor police scanners and deploy lookouts and
runners. Many of these security devices also serve as a defense against rival traffickers. It
is significant that the occupants of the apartment were not believed to employ any of
these protective techniques. MacDonald, 916 F.2d at 768. This omission suggests that
the suspects in the instant case were not overly concerned about security or imminent
violence.
9 Thomas, 893 F.2d at 490.
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report from the remaining officers on the street that the suspects
were attempting to escape.10 The police then gained access to
the apartment with a battering ram, arrested MacDonald and
seized the money, drugs and guns that were in plain view. 1
MacDonald objected to the warrantless entry at the suppression
hearing, but the trial court found that exigent circumstances12
justified the warrantless entry.13 A panel of the Second Circuit
reversed the trial court, but on rehearing in banc, the majority
reinstated the trial court's decision.
1 4
As a general rule, police must obtain a warrant before enter-
ing a home. 5 However, the Supreme Court has carved an excep-
tion to this rule that allows warrantless home entries when there
10 Id. at 485.
11 Id.
For a discussion of exigent circumstances see notes 100-33 and accompanying text
infra.
13 893 F.2d at 482.
14 MacDonald, 916 F.2d at 767.
15 See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980) (the police must obtain an arrest
warrant before entering a suspect's home); Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981)
(the police must obtain both an arrest warrant and a search warrant before entering a
home of a third party in order to arrest a suspect); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10
(1948) (the police must obtain a search warrant before entering a dwelling to search).
The courts have traditionally afforded the home the utmost protection. Indeed, ac-
cording to Justice Powell, "physical entry into the home is the chief evil against which
the fourth amendment is directed." United States v. United States District Court, 407
U.S. 297, 313 (1972). The warrant requirement is the major safeguard against govern-
ment's unreasonable entry into the home. One of the most quoted explanations of the
warrant requirement was penned by Justice Jackson. He wrote:
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous
officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual infer-
ences which reasonable people draw from evidence. Its protection consists in
requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate
instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enter-
prise of ferreting out crime. Any assumption that evidence sufficient to support
a magistrate's disinterested determination to issue a search warrant will justify
the officers in making a search without a warrant would reduce the amendment
to a nullity and leave the people's homes secure only in the discretion of police
officers. Crime, even in the privacy of one's own quarters, is, of course, of grave
concern to society, and the law allows such crime to be reached on proper
showing. The right of officers to thrust themselves into a home is also a grave
concern, not only to the individual but to a society which chooses to dwell in
reasonable security and freedom from surveillance. When the right of privacy
must reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a
judicial officer, not by a policeman, or government enforcement agent.
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. at 13-14 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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is an emergency.16 Recently the Court addressed and clarified
the exigent circumstances exception. In Minnesota v. Olson
17
the Court held that a warrantless entry may be justified by hot
pursuit of a fleeing felon, imminent destruction of evidence, the
need to prevent the suspect's escape, or the risk of danger to the
police or community.18 The crux of this analysis is whether am-
ple time exists for the police to obtain a warrant. If there is no
emergency, the police must obtain a warrant before entering a
person's home. 9
In MacDonald the Second Circuit held that exigent circum-
stances existed even before the agents knocked on the door and
identified themselves.20 The court announced that the "essen-
tial" question confronting it was whether under the totality of
the circumstances the police had an objective "urgent need" to
take immediate action.21 Although the agents had no reason to
11 The Supreme Court has upheld warrantless entries into a home only six times.
See Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978) (warrantless entry to extinguish a fire justifia-
ble); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978) (original entry during investigation of a
murder permitted, subsequent "crime scene" search forbidden); United States v.
Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976) ("hot pursuit" justified warrantless entry); Hill v. California,
401 U.S. 797 (1971) (warrantless entry on mistaken identity); Warden v. Hayden, 387
U.S. 294 (1967) (warrantless entry justified where armed suspect entered home less than
five minutes before police arrived); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 40 (1963) (exigent
circumstances justified foregoing "demand and explanation" requirement where suspect
possessed drugs that could be easily destroyed and agents reasonably believed that the
suspect was expecting them).
17 110 S. Ct. 1684 (1990).
10 Id. at 1690.
19 In this case, decided after the Thomas panel decision but before the rehearing in
banc, the Court upheld the Minnesota Supreme Court's finding that exigent circum-
stances did not exist. Id. at 1690. In Olson the police received word that an armed robber
had taken refuge in his girlfriend's apartment. Id. at 1686. The police surrounded the
apartment building, telephoned the girlfriend's apartment, and heard a man's voice tell-
ing the woman to tell the police that he was not in the apartment. Id. at 1687. Even
though the police had the apartment surrounded and there was little indication that the
suspect would injure his girlfriend they entered the apartment without a warrant. Id.
The Minnesota court found no justification for the warrantless entry. There was no flee-
ing felon, evidence was not in imminent danger of being destroyed, and there was no risk
of danger to the police or other persons. The Supreme Court endorsed the test used and
intimated that they upheld the application of the test in deference to the state court's
findings. Id. at 1690. The implication of this is that at least some of the Justices would
have affirmed a finding of exigent circumstances using the same test. Id. at 1691 (Ken-
nedy, J., concurring) ("I interpret... Part III as deference to a State court's application
of the exigent circumstances test to the facts of this case, and not as an endorsement of
that particular application of the standard.").
10 MacDonald, 916 F.2d at 770.
'1 Id. at 769 (citing Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385, 391 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (in
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believe that the suspects were aware of the surveillance, the
court held that an emergency situation existed that compelled
the police to act without a warrant. The court pointed to "the
volatile mix of drug sales, loaded weapons and likely drug
abuse" to show a "clear and immediate" risk of danger to the
police and public.2 2 The court virtually ignored the fact that the
drug business had been operating steadily for at least four
months, and there was no indication that business as usual
would not continue. By so holding, the Second Circuit has essen-
tially shaped a per se rule that empowers the police to enter a
suspected drug dealer's home without a warrant.23
The in banc majority also put forward an alternate hold-
ing.24 The court held that even if exigent circumstances did not
banc decision)).
2 Id. at 770.
2 Other circuits have also established a per se rule. See, eg., United States v. One
Parcel of Real Property, 873 F.2d 7, 9 (1st Cir. 1989) (presence of cocaine in house police
entered created exigency that justified warrantless entry), cert. denied sub nom. La
Traverse v. United States, 110 S. CL 236 (1989); United States v. Padilla, 869 F.2d 372,
379 (9th Cir. 1989) (arrest resulting from undercover drug transaction created exigent
circumstances because timing of arrests is special urgency in narcotics cases), cert. de-
nied sub nom. Percheitte v. United States, 109 S. Ct 3223 (1989); United States v. Boan-
ner, 874 F.2d 822, 824, 827 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (entry of home of drug dealers creates exi-
gency making police vulnerable because this type of offendor is "unusually attuned" to
and ready to respond to knocks at door); but see United States v. Stewart, 867 F.2d 581,
585 (10th Cir. 1989) (no exigency based on broad concerns about drug offenders in gen-
eral nor on the particular facts of the situation).
24 Actually, the court put forward two alternate holdings. In addition to finding that
the police did not impermissibly manufacture the exigent circumstances, the in banc
majority also held that because the undercover agent had the consent of the occupants to
enter the apartment during the undercover buy, and thus could have lawfully arrested
the occupants without a warrant, he did not have to obtain a warrant to reenter the
apartment ten minutes later.
The court seemed to be saying two things. First, the court implied that the concept
of consent can be extended to legitimize an entry made after the initial actual consent
was retracted. Because the police have the consent of the occupants of the home to be on
.the premises, they do not require a warrant. Undercover agents can legally be used to
obtain such consent. See Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 212 (1966) (consent to
conduct warrantless search valid when defendant invited undercover agent into home to
sell drugs). Moreover, because they are lawfully on the premises, they may arrest and
seize evidence and contraband in plain view without a warrant. Thus, because the under.
cover agent had the consent of the occupants to be in the apartment, be could have
arrested them for selling him drugs. The court's first rationale is not persuasive. After he
left the apartment the consent lapsed. The police ought not to be allowed to reenter the
apartment based on the earlier consent. Allowing such entries will seriously undermine
people's reasonable expectations of privacy. No one expects that consents last indefi-
nitely. Ordinarily, after visitors leave someone's home, they must receive permission to
1991]
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exist before the knock, they certainly did afterward. 25 Further-
more, the court held that the police did not improperly create
the exigent circumstances by knocking for the ostensible pur-
pose of receiving consent. The court stated that "when law en-
forcement agents act in an entirely lawful manner, they do not
impermissibly create exigent circumstances. 2 e The court re-
fused to engage in what it called "futile" speculation about the
agents' subjective states of mind and whether the police truly
believed the occupants would give consent to the police to
enter.27 However, this is not a case that calls for painstaking
speculation about motive or pretext. No reasonable police officer
could have thought that the occupants of the apartment would
consent to a search.28 It is troubling that the police should be
given broad license to create emergencies as a way to circumvent
reenter. Thus, there is no principled way to justify the officers entry based on the earlier
consent. But see United States v. Diaz, 814 F.2d 454, 459 (7th Cir. 1987) (warrantless
search valid when officer reentered home after summoning assistance when initial con-
sensual entry of undercover agent established probable cause), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 857
(1987).
Second, the court suggested that because a high level of probable cause existed, the
warrant requirement could be ignored, even in the absence of exigent circumstances. The
court spent little time analyzing the implications of this broad statement. Although the
court's creation of a variable standard for the warrant requirement seems principled, it is
actually at loggerheads with the fundamental rationale for the warrant requirement. In
order to properly protect privacy interests, officers should be allowed only limited discre-
tion to enter a home. The rule should be simple and clear: in the absence of exigent
circumstances or consent, officers should always obtain a warrant before entering a
home. See note 15 supra for an explanation of the warrant requirement's purpose.
25'MacDonald, 916 F.2d at 771. The alternate holdings were not necessary. The
court could have simply summarily held that exigent circumstances existed before the
knock and stopped there. However, the Second Circuit seemed determined to use this
case to establish looser guidelines for police conduct. See notes 141-65 and accompanying
text infra. Like government officials, the court is cognizant of the scope of the drug prob-
lem. Perhaps this awareness explains the alternate holdings.
26 Id. at 772.
27 Id.
28 Police officers may enter a home without a warrant if the occupant of the home
consents. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973). In order for there to be a
valid consent, it must be voluntarily given. There can be no coercion. Id. It is quite
possible that the police never even attempted to gain a consent. It is easy to imagine a
scenario where the agents improperly entered the suspects' home, then testified that
they attempted to get a consent as a way to sterilize their otherwise unlawful entry. It is
hard to accept that seasoned narcotics officers would have attempted to gain a consent to
search from armed drug dealers. However, this is pure speculation and unnecessary to
the outcome of the case. For a discussion of police ethics in this area, see Maclin, Book





This Comment will demonstrate that the Second Circuit's
decision in MacDonald is consistent with its recent decisions in
this area. This Comment will argue, however, that the Second
Circuit's analysis unduly erodes Fourth Amendment protections
to the home in order to achieve more efficient law enforcement.
Part I will recount the facts and procedural history of the case.
Part H will review the exigent circumstances exception gener-
ally, with an emphasis on the Second Circuit's approach prior to
MacDonald. Part III will critique the alternate holdings in this
case. Finally, this Comment will conclude that the Second Cir-
cuit should revisit this area in order to shape an exigent circum-
stances exception more consistent with the Fourth Amendment.
I. UNITED STATES V. MACDONALD
A. Background
In May of 1988 a reliable confidential informant told agents
of the New York Drug Enforcement Task Force ("Task Force")
that she had recently spent several hours in apartment 1-0 at
321 Edgecombe Avenue ("the apartment"). 9 While there she
observed that narcotics, including marijuana and cocaine, were
being stored in the apartment.30 She also informed the Task
Force that she was taken to a third floor apartment in the same
building where more narcotics were stored.3 1 Based on this infor-
mation, six Task Force agents commenced surveillance of the
apartment on the evening of September 8, 1988.2
The six agents began the surveillance of the premises at ap-
proximately 6:30 p.m. Using unmarked cars designed to blend in
with the cars in the neighborhood, the agents arranged them-
selves around the building in order to watch the activity.3 3 Al-
29 Thomas, 893 F.2d at 482, 483-84. Although the informant was described as relia-
ble, there is no indication that probable cause existed to obtain a warrant just on the
basis of the confidential information. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), for an
exposition of the probable cause standard and note 122 infra for a brief discussion.
30 893 F.2d at 484.
31 Id.
Id. Approximately four months elapsed between the time the agents received the
tip and the beginning of the surveillance operation. This lag undermines the assumption
that an emergency situation existed to justify a warrantless entry.
11 The surveillance operation was done well. The agents blended into the neighbor-
hood, seemingly unobserved. Id. at 489. During three hours of surveillance, the agents
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though the agents had established through observation that
probable cause existed to make an arrest without a controlled
buy, they chose to proceed with an undercover investigation to
gather more evidence. 4
At approximately 9:50 p.m. Agent Agee of the Task Force
("Agee") entered the building shadowed by another agent.36
Agee knocked at the apartment door and was admitted .3  Agee
saw six men in the apartment, one pointing a cocked 9 millime-
ter pistol in his direction. 7 He saw MacDonald, sitting on the
couch counting money, within reach of a .357 Magnum re-
volver.38 Agee also smelled marijuana in the apartment and saw
what appeared to be bags of cocaine and marijuana on a tableYe
Agee did not recognize any of the men in the apartment and did
not believe that any of the men recognized him.40 While in the
apartment Agee saw no indication that the suspects had any se-
curity devices present.41 After purchasing a five dollar bag of
marijuana, Agee exited the apartment.42 The agent who
shadowed Agee was so inconspicuous that even Agee did not see
him enter or exit the building.43
saw between 15 and 20 people drive up to the apartment. Id. at 484. Automobiles would
double park, a passenger would enter the apartment, exit in a few minutes, and drive off.
This pattern convinced the officers that the occupants of the apartment were engaged in
drug selling. Id. Agent Agee telephoned his supervisor, and it was decided that they
would go forward with a controlled buy. Id.
3 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id. While inside he observed that the apartment consisted of two rooms. Each
room had one window that faced Edgecomb Avenue. He also noticed that there was only
one door to the apartment. These facts suggest that the police could have secured the
premises during the few hours it would have taken to obtain a warrant.
37 Id. at 484-85.
Id. at 483.
30MacDonald, 916 F.2d at 768. Although Agee claimed to smell burning marijuana,
he did not actually see any of the occupants smoking. Id. at 775.
40 Thomas, 893 F.2d at 489. The fact that none of the occupants of the apartment
recognized Agee as a narcotics officer reinforces the belief that the suspects had no idea
that they were being watched. Thus, escape or destruction of evidence probably was not
imminent. Additionally, the fact that the suspects had no apparent security devices, and
thus no knowledge of police surveillance, also undermines the assumption that exigent
circumstances existed. Indeed, these facts suggest that the suspects were not aware of
the police presence and would continue with business as usual.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 485.
43 Id. at 489. The fact that even Agee did not see the agent who shadowed him into
the building should have suggested to the officers that their surveillance was inconspicu-
[Vol. 57: 307
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After rejoining his compatriots Agee, along with his supervi-
sor who had arrived on the scene, formulated a plan to gain ac-
cess to the apartment." An agent was to go to the apartment
and speak with the person who sold Agee the drugs and seek
consent for a search.45 No effort was made to procure a search
warrant.46 Indeed, even though Agee testified at the suppression
hearing that he had twice in the past obtained a search warrant
by telephone,4 none of the agents even discussed the possibility
of obtaining a warrant.48
At approximately 10 p.m. Agee and six other agents re-
turned to the apartment.49  Other agents remained outside. 0
With guns drawn, the agents knocked on the door and identified
themselves.5 1 They received no response but heard sounds of
movement and shuffling.52 They then received a radio communi-
ous. Far from indicating imminent destruction of evidence or escape, this fact also sup-
ports the belief that the suspects were unaware of the police presence.
4, Id. at 485.
45 Id. at 489.
46 Id. at 485.
47 Id. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure allow for telephonic warrants. FED.
R. CRIn P. 41(c). This process can take up to several hours in New York City. See
Thomas, 893 F.2d at 483.
48 Id. Officers should always think about getting a warrant before entering a home.
Of course in an emergency situation there may not be enough time to discuss the possi-
bility of obtaining a warrant. However, in the present case, the officers had enough time
to formulate a plan of action. Thus, they had enough time to at least make a good faith
attempt to secure a warrant. It is unclear why these particular agents found it unneces-
sary even to broach the subject of obtaining a warrant. The use of the exclusionary rule
when the police do not make a good faith effort to obtain a warrant would reaffirm to
police officers the importance of constitutional considerations before intruding into con-
stitutionally protected areas such as the home. There is an unresolved conflict in the
Ninth Circuit with regard to good faith attempts to secure warrants. See United States
v. Alvarez, 810 F.2d 879, 883 (9th Cir. 1987) (A panel of the Ninth Circuit denied the
applicability of the exigent circumstances exception where the police failed to attempt to
secure a warrant. The panel held that a warrantless arrest was not justified where officers
failed to make good faith effort to secure a warrant.); but ef. United States v. Smith, 802
F.2d 1119, 1124 (9th Cir. 1986) (Another panel of the Ninth Circuit held that a warrant-
less arrest was valid even though officer did not make good faith effort to obtain a
warrant.).
9 Thomas, 893 F.2d at 485.
50 Id.
"I Id. It is significant that the agents approached the door with their guns drawn
and equipped with a battering ram. This belies the assertion that they went to the door
to obtain a consent and not to precipitate exigent circumstances. Indeed, since the linch-
pin of a valid consent is its voluntariness, it is difficult to imagine a court upholding a
consent given at the end of a pointed gun. See note 28 supra.
893 F.2d at 485.
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cation from the agents outside informing them that the suspects
were attempting to escape through the windows.5 3 With a bat-
tering ram, the agents subsequently broke down the door."'
There were five men in the apartment, all of whom were ar-
rested.55 The man who had sold Agee the drugs was not pre-
sent.5' The agents also seized the 9 millimeter pistol, the .357
magnum revolver, 443 grams of cocaine, approximately four and
one-half kilograms of marijuana, a scale, a grinder, various pack-
aging materials, and large amounts of cash. 7
B. The District Court Opinion
Errol MacDonald was tried and convicted in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York.58
During the pretrial suppression hearing MacDonald argued that
the evidence against him should be suppressed because it was
seized in violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment of
the Constitution.
The court denied the motion to suppress on the ground that
the government met the burden of showing that the warrantless
entry was justified by exigent circumstances.5" The court pointed
to the fact that MacDonald was engaged in serious ongoing
criminal activity that often involves violence and was in the po-
sition to use the weapons at his disposal. 0 Additionally, the
court found that the agents had an urgent need to make a war-
rantless entry in order to prevent the destruction or loss of evi-
dence or the flight of suspects."1






58 Id. at 482, 483. MacDonald was convicted of possession with intent to distribute
cocaine and of using or carrying a firearm during a drug trafficking crime.
59 Id.
10 Id. at 485. This ability, according to the court, created an emergency situation
justifying immediate entry.
" Id. at 486. At the time the agents made the entry, they knew the defendant con-
trolled another apartment in the building. However, the agents had not been able to
identify the location of this other apartment. Hence, according to the court, It would
have been fairly simple for the defendant to remove himself or the contraband to this
other unknown location, putting himself and the evidence beyond the reach of the au-
thorities while they waited for a search warrant.
[Vol. 57: 307
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selves and the door was not opened, any delay in arresting the
suspects would very likely result in the destruction of evidence,
particularly the cocaine which could be flushed down the toilet
in a matter of moments.6 2 Finally, the court commented that the
late hour supported the agents' reasonable belief that they could
not wait for a warrant. Because the events took place at approxi-
mately 10:00 p.m., it would have taken at least a couple of hours
for them to obtain a warrant.6
3
C. The Second Circuit Panel Decision
6
4
MacDonald appealed his conviction and contended that the
district court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evi-
dence seized as a result of the warrantless entry into the apart-
ment.6 5 A two-judge majority agreed with MacDonald and re-
manded his case to determine whether MacDonald had the
requisite standing to suppress the evidence."
The panel began its discussion of exigent circumstances
with the proposition that, in the absence of consent, "a search or
seizure carried out on a suspect's premises without a warrant is
per se unreasonable, unless the government can show ... the
presence of exigent circumstances."' 7 Furthermore, the panel as-
serted, the burden on the government is a heavy one, for the
presumption of unreasonableness that attaches to warrantless
home entries is not easily overcome.6
According to the panel, the fundamental question in deter-
mining whether sufficient exigency exists to make a warrantless
home entry reasonable is whether the law enforcement officers
had objective reason to believe there was an urgent need that
62 Id.
" Id. Nighttime warrants are more difficult to obtain because of the limited number
of magistrates available at those hours.
"The panel decision was not unanimous. Judge Altimari, who wrote the in banc
decision, dissented in the panel decision. This Comment will not recount this dissent
because its points are more fully made in the in banc decision. See note3 86-99 and
accompanying text infra.
Thomas, 893 F.2d at 483.
"Up until this point, the threshold issue of standing had been assumed but never
decided. Only an individual who has the proper standing may suppre:s unconstitution-
ally obtained evidence. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) (only individuals whose
legitimate expectation of privacy is violated have standing to suppress evidence).
67 Thomas, 893 F.2d at 486 (quoting Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 749 (1934)).
" Id. at 486.
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justified the entry.69 Like many other courts, the Second Circuit
has adopted the factors articulated by the District of Columbia
Circuit in United States v. Dorman as the framework within
which to analyze whether exigent circumstances exist. 0 Al-
though the panel accepted the Dorman factors, it claimed that
they are "'illustrative, [and] not exclusive.' ,7 Hence, the exi-
gent circumstances test is akin to a totality of the circumstances
test with the Dorman factors acting as a "rough guidepost.
72
According to the panel, the district court's finding that exi-
gent circumstances justified the warrantless entry was clearly er-
roneous.73 The court held that prior to the agents identifying
themselves as police officers, there were no objective facts that
raised any likelihood of imminent flight, destruction of evidence,
transfer of evidence, or violence.74
The panel, although acknowledging that the gravity of the
offense is an appropriate consideration in exigent circumstances
analysis, refused to conflate the seriousness of the underlying of-
fense with the existence of exigent circumstances. 7 According to
the panel, "Some urgency, apart from the nature of these of-
" Id. at 487. The cases make clear that officers require only reasonable suspicion
that exigent circumstances exist to justify a warrantless search. See United States v.
Agapito, 620 F.2d 324, 336 n.18 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 834 (1980) (arrest-
ing officers need "a reasonable belief that third persons are aware of the arrest outside so
they may destroy evidence"). In Minnesota v. Olson, 110 S. Ct. 1684 (1990), the Supreme
Court approved a test requiring police officers to have probable cause to believe that an
emergency exists. However, it is doubtful that the probable cause standard is constitu-
tionally mandated. In Olson, the Court merely approved of one court's test; it did not
hold that the test was the only legitimate approach. Moreover, given the seriousness of
the risks implicated, there is no reason to demand that the police have a high level of
suspicion before acting. Indeed, in other areas of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence,
where risk of harm exists, only reasonable suspicion is needed before acting. See Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 2 (1967) (police need only reasonable suspicion that person is armed
before frisking for weapons).
70 435 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1970). See text accompanying note 109 infra.
7' Thomas, 893 F.2d at 487 (quoting United States v. Martinez-Gonzalez, 686 F.2d
93, 100 (2d Cir. 1982)).
7 893 F.2d at 487.
11 Id. at 490. The court found that the record, taken in the light most favorable to
the government, did not reveal that the agents had insufficient time to obtain a warrant.
1, Id. at 489. These factors mirror those approved by the Supreme Court in Minne.
sota v. Olson, 110 S. Ct. 1684 (1990). See notes 104-07 and accompanying text infra.
" Thomas, 893 F.2d at 489.
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fenses, must be demonstrated. '" 76 Furthermore, the panel re-
fused to accept the district court's finding that the ease with
which the suspects could transfer the narcotics necessitated the
immediate entry into the apartment.77 The panel acknowledged
that it may have been simple for the defendants to effect a
transfer. However, "[s]implicity is not the touchstone, because
there was no reason to believe they would change the four
months operation now when they hadn't been alerted to the
September 8 surveillance.1
78
Before the police revealed their presence to the suspects
there was no objective urgency compelling the agents to forego
obtaining a warrant. 9 Furthermore, the court noted with disbe-
lief Agee's explanation of the reasons for returning to the apart-
ment.80 Agee testified that it was "[j]ust to talk to the person.
Hopefully the person that sold me the marijuana would still be
there and try to obtain a consent to search the apartment."81
The court found this to be nothing more than a pretext, a way
for the police to manufacture exigent circumstances in order to
circumvent the warrant requirement.8 2 The court noted that be-
cause Agee observed two weapons in the apartment, "any notion
that the occupants might docilely consent to a search seems at
best surreal."8 " In addition, the way in which the agents ap-
proached the door belied the suggestion that they thought they
could obtain a consent to search. They approached en masse,
equipped with a battering ram, with their guns drawn.84 The
court concluded by warning that "[i]f the circumstances shown
here may properly be deemed 'exigent,' we doubt that agents
who have compelling evidence of an ongoing narcotics operation













D. In Banc Decision"6
The court granted rehearing in banc87 to consider whether a
warrantless entry was lawful pursuant to the exigent circum-
stances exception to the Fourth Amendment, and if so whether
the law enforcement officials improperly created the exigent cir-
cumstances.88 The court, sitting in banc, vacated the panel's de-
cision and reinstated the district court's decision.89
Like the panel, the in banc majority asserted that the essen-
tial inquiry is whether there was an "urgent need" for the of-
ficers to take action.90 The in banc majority agreed that the test
is an objective one that turns on the totality of the circum-
stances.9 1 Furthermore, the in banc majority employed the
Dorman factors as an analytical tool to determine whether
under the totality of the circumstances exigent circumstances
existed at the time the entry was made.92
Unlike the panel, however, the in banc majority applied the
Dorman factors and found that~the district court was "far from
clearly erroneous. 9 3 According to the majority, all of the factors
were met. First, narcotics trafficking is a grave offense. Second,
the agents knew that there were at least two weapons in the
apartment. Third, the agents had firsthand knowledge that an
ongoing crime was transpiring. Fourth, the agents knew that the
suspects were in the apartment. Fifth, the likelihood that the
perpetrators might escape was confirmed because the actual
seller of the contraband escaped during the ten minute interval
after the controlled buy and before the entry. Sixth, the officers
0' Although there was a vigorous dissent, most of the arguments were put forward in
the panel decision and need not be repeated. See note 64-85 and accompanying text
supra.
87 Traditionally the Second Circuit grants the fewest in banc rehearings of all the
circuits. Indeed, between 1984 and 1988 the court sat in banc only 1.4 times a year. This
is in sharp contrast to the other eleven circuits which averaged seven cases per circuit
per year. See Newman, In Banc Practice in the Second Circuit, 1984-1988, 55 BR00KLYN
L. Rav. 355, 356 (1989). A majority of the judges on the circuit must vote to grant rehear-
ing in banc. Ordinarily, rehearing in banc is granted when a case presents significant
legal issues that must be resolved or clarified. Id.
MacDonald, 916 F.2d at 767.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 769.
01 Id.
:2 Id. at 769-70.
-1 Id. at 770.
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acted lawfully by first attempting a peaceful entry by knocking
and announcing themselves. Because the requisite factors had
been met, the in banc majority determined that exigent circum-
stances existed even before the agents knocked at the door."
The court also argued that even if there were no preexisting
exigency, the entry was justifiable. First, the court stated that a
controlled purchase by undercover agents "'is a recognized and
permissible means of investigation"' useful to gather informa-
tion and make lawful arrests. 5 Because it certainly would have
been legal for Agee to make an arrest during the initial con-
trolled buy, it follows that he could reenter the apartment
within ten minutes without a warrant with fellow agents re-
tained as back-up and protection.96 Second, the court announced
that so long as the police act in accordance with the law, the
court will not find that they have impermissibly manufactured
exigent circumstances.97 Thus, because the agents attempted a
peaceful entry within the bounds of the law, the court would not
invalidate that entry simply because it was foreseeable that exi-
gent circumstances would flow from that activity. The court re-
fused to attribute any significance to the subjective states of
mind of the officers.9
Finally, the majority answered the panel's warning that to
allow a warrantless entry in this circumstance would obviate a
need for a warrant in practically all narcotics operations. The
court stated:
If it is true that ongoing retail narcotics operations often confront law
enforcement agents with exigent circumstances, we fail to see how
such a said reality constitutes a ground for declaring that the exigen-
4 Id.
,Id. at 771 (quoting United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 432 (1973)).
For a discussion of consent, see note 28 supra.
97 MacDonald, 916 F.2d at 772. For a discussion of this aspect of the decision see
notes 148-54 and accompanying text infra.
9S MacDonald, 916 F.2d at 772. The court cited a First Circuit case to illuminate the
lack of importance of subjective intent in exigent circumstances analysis. In United
States v. Rengifo, 858 F.2d 800 (1st Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1023 (1989), agents
telephoned suspects and wrongfully informed them that the police had arrested their
compatriots. The suspects, after receiving the call, started to scurry about their apart-
ment. As a result, the agents claimed that they had reason to believe that the suspects
were attempting to destroy evidence. Thus, the agents effected a warrantless entry. The
suspects argued that the agents should not be allowed to engage in such contrived con-
duct as.a way to bypass the warrant requirement. The First Circuit did not agree, calling
the technique "creative investigative" work. Id. at 803.
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cies do not, in fact, exist. To disallow the exigent circumstances excep-
tion in'these cases would be to tie the hands of law enforcement
agents who are entrusted with the responsibility of combatting grave,
ongoing crimes in a manner fully consistent with the constitutional
protection afforded to all citizens.99
II. , EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES
A. Scope of the Exigent Circumstances Exception
The Fourth Amendment requires that police officers obtain
a warrant before entering a home to search or to arrest.100 How-
ever, if exigent circumstances arise, the police may lawfully
enter a dwelling without a warrant or consent. The Supreme
Court has recognized an exigent circumstances exception in both
the arrest and search contexts.101 Indeed, the test for exigent cir-
cumstances is essentially the same in both instances.10 2 Simply
stated, exigent circumstances exist when under the totality of
the circumstances there is a "compelling need for official action
and no time to secure a warrant." 108
In Minnesota v. Olson"0 4 the Supreme Court approved the
Minnesota Supreme Court's test to determine whether exigent
circumstances exist to justify a warrantless entry. The Minne-
sota court listed four factors that may justify a warrantless en-
try: 1) the "hot pursuit" of a suspected felon; 2) probable cause
to believe that there is the risk of imminent destruction of evi-
dence; 3) probable cause to believe that immediate action is nec-
essary to prevent the suspect's escape; and 4) probable cause to
:1 MacDonald, 916 F.2d at 772-73.
100 See note 15 supra.
101 See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (threatened destruction of evidence
by a person for whom probable cause to arrest existed justified a warrantless entry when
there was no time to secure a warrant); United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976) (in
a classic hot pursuit case, the Court stated that a "suspect may not defeat an arrest
which has been set in motion in a public place ... by the expedient of escaping to a
private place"); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948) (negative implication to
the effect that "exceptional" circumstances may dispense with the need for a search
warrant).
102 See Donnino & Girese, Exigent Circumstances for a Warrantless Home Arrest,
45 ALB. L. REV. 90, 91 (1980) ("the occasional broad language used by the Court to give
meaning to the term "exigent circumstances" in a search context provides us with insight
into the meaning of the term in an arrest context").
1o3 Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 (1978).
110 S. Ct. 1684 (1990).
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believe that there is risk of danger to the police or to the com-
munity if immediate action is not taken.1' 5 The court also ex-
plained that when assessing the risk of danger, the gravity of the
crime and the likelihood the duspect is armed should be
considered." 6
The Olson test is a refinement of the standard crafted by
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Dorman v.
United States.07 Dorman was one of the earliest and most im-
portant cases in exigent circumstances analysis.108 In that case,
I5 Id. at 1690. The Minnesota court's test is a conglomerate of the factors that the
Supreme Court has announced in the past to be relevant to exigent circumstances analy-
sis. When reviewing prior Supreme Court cases in the area, it is clear that the Court had
"definitive thoughts" on what constitutes a compelling need for action. Donnino &
Girese, supra note 102, at 96. For example, in Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10
(1948), one of the earliest cases dealing with exigent circumstances, the Court stated.
There are exceptional circumstances in which, on balancing the need for effec-
tive law enforcement against the right of privacy, it may be contended that a
magistrate's warrant for a search may be dispensed with. But this is not such a
case. No reason is offered for not obtaining a warrant except the inconvenience
to the officers and some slight delay necessary to prepare papers and present
the evidence to the magistrate. These are never very convincing reasons and, in
these circumstances, certainly are not enough to by-pass the constitutional re-
quirement. No suspect was fleeing or likely to take flight .... No evidence or
contraband was threatened with removal or destruction ....
Id. at 14-15 (emphasis added).
The Court has continually relied on the factors enunciated in Johnson whenever it
has revisited the exigent circumstances area. See Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970)
(confirms by implication the importance of destruction of evidence as justification for a
warrantless home entry). Additionally, the Court has also held that risk to human life
and hot pursuit of a fleeing felon are also situations that give rise to exigent circum-
stances. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967) ("The Fourth Amendment
does not require police officers to delay in the course of an investigation if to do so would
gravely endanger their lives or the lives of others.") (emphasis added); United States v.
Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 43 (1976) (a suspect may not invalidate an arrest by escaping to a
private place). See also Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 16 n.7 (1948) ("We find
no element of 'hot pursuit' in the arrest of one who was not in flight, as completely
surrounded by agents before she knew of their presence.., and who made no attempt
to escape.").
106 Olson, 110 S. Ct. at 1690.
107 435 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (in banc).
103 In Dorman the police had probable cause to believe that the suspect was in-
valved in an armed robbery, based on evidence found on the scene of the crime. The
suspect had left his probation papers at the scene of the crime, thereby identifying him-
self. The police feared that the suspect might realize his error and attempt to escape or
destroy evidence if they did not arrest him quickly. Because of the late hour and diffi-
culty in finding a magistrate, the police entered the suspect's home without a warrant.
The court upheld the entry and formulated the six factors as a way to analyzo the myr-
iad of factual situations that can arise in the street. The factors were thus offered not as
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the court listed six factors pertinent to a finding of exigent cir-
cumstances: 1) the gravity of the offense; 2) that the suspect is
reasonably believed to be armed; 3) a clear showing of probable
cause to believe the suspect committed the crime involved; 4) a
strong reason to believe the suspect is in the premises being en-
tered; 5) a likelihood that the suspect will escape if not appre-
hended; and 6) that the police attempt a peaceful entry.""'
These factors are intended to facilitate the critical determina-
tion of whether an objective urgency compelled the warrantless
entry. Although the Dorman factors have severe limitations as
an analytic tool,11" many courts still employ them when analyz-
ing exigent circumstances. 1 ' Given the inherent limitations of
the Dorman factors, the formulation of the exigent circum-
stances exception put forward in Olson should replace the cur-
rent reliance on the Dorman factors. The Olson decision does
not lose sight of the total picture by atomizing the analysis. 12
B. Second Circuit's Approach Prior to MacDonald
The Second Circuit initially adopted the Dorman factors
without modification in United States v. Reed."3 Then in
United States v. Campbell"4 the Second Circuit clarified its ap-
proach and stated that "circumstances which, when viewed as of
a talisman of exigent circumstances, but rather as a framework within which police of.
ficers and trial judges can make the fundamental determination of whether an urgency
existed that justified the warrantless entry.
109 435 F.2d at 391-92. The Dorman factors are not without their detractors. They
have been criticized as being impracticable, demanding "a complicated weighing and bal-
ancing of a multitude of imprecise factors." W. LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SnizuR&n A TREATISE
ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 390 (1978). More important, it is possible for many of the
Dorman factors to exist in cases where there is no exigency. See, e.g., United States v.
Lindsay, 506 F.2d 166 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Commonwealth v. Forde, 367 Mass. 798, 329
N.E.2d 717 (1975); Commonwealth v. Williams, 483 Pa. 293, 396 A.2d 1177 (1978), cert.
denied, 446 U.S. 912 (1980). See also Donnino & Birese, supra note 102, at 99-106; Note,
Warrantless Entry to Arrest: A Practical Solution to a Fourth Amendment Problem,
1978 U. ILL. L. RE V. 655, 678-80.
110 See note 109 supra.
,' See, e.g., United States v. Standridge, 810 F.2d 1034, 1037 (11th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 481 U.S. 1072 (1987); United States v. Baldacchin, 762 F.2d 170, 176 (1st Cir.
1985); United States v. Kulcsar, 586 F.2d 1283, 1287 (8th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Phillips, 497 F.2d 1131, 1135 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v. Shye, 492 F.2d 886, 891
(6th Cir. 1974).
I" See note 109 supra.
118 572 F.2d 412 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 913 (1978).
114 581 F.2d 22 (2d Cir. 1978).
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the time of the entry, would lead a reasonable person to believe
that unless an entry and arrest are made immediately the sus-
pect may escape, destroy essential evidence or continue the com-
mission of an on-going crime, represent exigencies of the type
justifying immediate police action on probable cause without
first obtaining a warrant."11 The court went on to explain that
the Dorman criteria are "[a]mong the factors deemed relevant in
determining whether the circumstances are sufficiently exigent
to permit a warrantless entry."
110
As the Second Circuit developed the law in this area it an-
nounced its intention to move away from the mechanical appli-
cation of the Dorman factors in favor of a "totality of the cir-
cumstances" approach.1 17 The court claims to employ the
Dorman factors as mere guideposts for police and judges to use
when determining the existence of exigent circumstances.""
Hence, the court announced that the presence or absence of one
factor is not conclusive."1 ' Rather, the reviewing judge must look
at all the facts from the vantage point of the officer at the time
of the entry, keeping in mind that "[t]he essential question in
determining whether exigent circumstances justified a warrant-
less entry is whether law enforcement agents were confronted by
an 'urgent need' to render aid or take action."120 Thus, the Sec-
ond Circuit's purported methodology jibes with the recent Olson
decision."'
11 Id. at 26. This test is identical to the one approved in Olson. 110 S. Ct. 1684,
1690 (1990).
11 581 F.2d at 22.
11 See United States v. Crespo, 834 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1987); United States v. Cat-
touse, 846 F.2d 144 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 929 (1988); United States v. Zabare,
871 F.2d 282 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 161 (1989).
218 MacDonald, 916 F.2d at 769.
119 Id. at 770.
120 Id. at 769.
121 Acceptance of a single standard to analyze exigent circumstance3 does not guar-
antee uniform results. Exigent circumstances analysis remains a fact-sensitive enterprise.
As a result, the scope of the exception expands and contracts as different courts apply
the standard. Indeed, even in Olson, some members of the Court implied that they
would have found that exigent circumstances existed under the facts of the case using
the same test employed by the Minnesota Supreme Court. See Olson, 110 S. Ct. at 1690.
See also United States v. Cattouse, 846 F.2d 144, 146 (2d Cir. 1988) (a district court's




C. Timeframe to Secure a Warrant
The underlying issue in all exigent circumstances cases is
whether the police had enough time to secure a warrant before
effecting an entry. It is necessary therefore to determine at what
point in an investigation a warrant should be sought. A warrant
may be issued only upon a showing of probable cause. 22 How-
ever, courts do not demand that police officers obtain and exe-
cute a warrant at the earliest showing of probable cause.1 23 The
quantum of evidence sufficient to give rise to probable cause is
often insufficient to lead to a conviction. Hence, it may be more
efficient for the police to develop their case before effecting an
immediate entry. This leeway, in a sense, conflicts with the gen-
eral proscription against warrantless entries. The longer the po-
lice investigate and refrain from obtaining a warrant, the greater
the likelihood that exigent circumstances will develop, triggering
the justification for a warrentless entry.
The Supreme Court has offered little guidance to lower
courts on this aspect of exigent circumstances analysis. In Card-
well v. Lewis 12 4 the Court held that the police will not be barred
automatically from acting on an exigency even if they could have
obtained a warrant earlier. However, this case failed to set up
workable guidelines to determine how the police should conduct
themselves during this interim period. The Second Circuit at-
"' The Constitution establishes probable cause as the appropriate level of suspicion
required to obtain a warrant. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV, § 2. See note 1 supra. Probable
cause is an objective standard measuring whether law enforcement officials have suffi-
cient evidence to make a reasonable person think the arrest or search justified. There is
probable cause to arrest when more likely than not the person named in the warrant
committed or is committing a crime. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 602-03
(1980). There is probable cause to search when "there is a fair probability that contra-
band or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place." Illinois v. Gates, 462
U.S. 213, 238 (1983).
128 The police are not constitutionally required to search or arrest just because prob-
able cause exists. In the context of arrests, the Supreme Court has held that: "Law en-
forcement officers are under no constitutional duty to call a halt to a criminal investiga-
tion the moment they have the minimum evidence to establish probable cause, a
quantum of evidence which may fall far short of the amount necessary to support a
criminal conviction." Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 310 (1966), reh'g denied, 386
U.S. 940 (1967). The same rationale supports the conclusion that police may refrain from
searching in order to promote their investigation.
124 417 U.S. 583, 595-96 (1974) ("the fact that the police might have obtained a war-




tempted to shape such a guideline in United States v. Segura.12 5
The Segura court ruled that "'when the emergency justification
is advanced, we believe it is appropriate to appraise the agents'
conduct during the entire period after they had a right to obtain
a warrant and not merely from the moment when they knocked
at the front door.' "126 The Segura court further held that the
police may not deliberately manufacture the exigency.12 7 The
court refused to expand the exigent circumstances exception to
include unnecessary police conduct designed to give rise to
emergencies.128
After Segura, defendants unsuccessfully challenged war-
rantless entries when the investigatory techniques used
foreseeably gave rise to exigent circumstances, and the agents
could have obtained a warrant earlier in the day. 29 In United
States v. Cattouse 30 the court addressed this issue and held
that agents may "wait 'until such time as events ha[ve] pro-
ceeded to a point where the agents could be reasonably certain
that the evidence would ultimately support a conviction"'
before obtaining a warrant."' The court also quoted Cardwell,
stating, "'the fact that the police might have obtained a warrant
earlier does not negate the possibility of a current situation's ne-
125 663 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1981), affd on other grounds, 468 U.S. 798 (1984). In this
case, agents arrested a co-conspirator in the lobby of a building. The agents then brought
the suspect up to his co-conspirator's apartment, causing a scene. The agents then made
a warrantless entry, claiming that because the occupants of the apartment were aware of
the arrest, exigent circumstances existed. The court refused to allow the officers to man-
ufacture exigencies in that way and suppressed the evidence.
2" 663 F.2d at 415 (quoting United States v. Rosselli, 506 F.2d 627, 630 (7th Cir.
1974)).
12 663 F.2d at 411. Many courts have agreed that the police may not themselve3
create an exigency. See, e.g., United States v. Hemandez-Cano, 808 F.2d 779, 782 (11th
Cir.) (no exigent circumstances where police could have removed the exigency by arrest-
ing the suspect), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 918 (1987); United States v. Munoz-Guerra, 788
F.2d 295, 298 (5th Cir. 1986) (no exigent circumstances when the police intentionally
confronted suspect not aware of the surveillance when they could have secured the prem-
ises); United States v. Driver, 776 F.2d 807, 810-11 (9th Cir. 1985) (no exigent circum-
stances because the police would not have feared for their safety had they not entered
warehouse where the suspects were located).
128 663 F.2d at 415.
"0 See, e.g., United States v. Zabare, 871 F.2d 282 (2d Cir. 1989); United States v.
Cattouse, 846 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1988).
1$0 846 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1988).




cessitating prompt police action.' ",132 Moreover, in Cattouse the
Second Circuit allowed the police to utilize investigatory tech-
niques that tend to give rise to exigencies as long as "they were
appropriate and were not adopted for the purpose of creating
exigent circumstances. '" 13 3 Thus, prior to MacDonald, the trend
in the Second Circuit was to expand the scope of the exception
to include preventable warrantless entries.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Exigent Circumstances Before the Knock
1. The Application of the Dorman Factors
The majority in MacDonald employed a somewhat mechan-
istic jurisprudence in concluding that exigent circumstances ex-
isted in MacDonald to justify the warrantless entry. Notwith-
standing its assertion that exigent circumstances analysis
demands a totality of the circumstances approach, the court em-
ployed the Dorman factors in a checklist fashion.134 Because the
132 846 F.2d at 147 (quoting Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974)).
133 846 F.2d at 148. See also United States v. Zabare, 871 F.2d 282 (2d Cir. 1989). In
Zabare the FBI had been alerted to a ticket scalping conspiracy. The FBI placed under-
cover agents who "sold" the defendant counterfeit tickets. The FBI marked the tickets
void in case something went wrong with the operation and the defendant disseminated
the tickets to the public. Immediately after completing the sale, the FBI entered the
suspect's apartment without a warrant. The government argued that the agents could
reasonably have believed that as soon as the defendant discovered the void markings, he
would warn the other members of the conspiracy and thus endanger the lives of the
other undercover agents. The defendant argued that the government should not be able
to invoke the exigent circumstances exception because the agents created the exigency
by their own actions. The court upheld the warrantless entry because it found that the
government's decision to mark the tickets void was "reasonable" in light of the concern
that the tickets might have reached the public. In reaching this conclusion, the court
relied on Cattouse. Quoting from that opinion, the court stated that "'the investigative
techniques were appropriate and were not adopted for the purpose of creating exigent
circumstances.'" Zabare, 871 F.2d at 290 (quoting Cattouse, 846 F.2d at 148).
Cattouse and Zabare reveal the readiness of the Second Circuit to accept police
investigative techniques that foreseeably give rise to exigent circumstances. The only ap-
parent limitation to police discretion in this area lies in the "reasonableness" of their
activity. The court is willing to uphold police investigatory techniques that give rise to
exigent circumstances as long as they were not adopted for the purpose of creating exi-
gent circumstances. Thus, if the police can put forward a plausible explanation for their
conduct, the court will sanction it, even if it tends to give rise to exigent circumstances.
Id.
134 According to the majority, all the Dorman factors indicating the existence of exi-
gent circumstances were present. The suspects were armed and the police had strong
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court was able to pigeonhole the facts of MacDonald into the
Dorman framework, it found that there was a legitimate emer-
gency that justified police action. This approach is insufficient
because of the limitations inherent in the factors themselves.
The presence of all the factors does not necessarily mean that
exigent circumstances exist.
Moreover, the majority was simply wrong when it asserted
that all the Dorman factors were met. The dissent correctly
stated that there was absolutely no indication that the dealers
would attempt to escape before the police identified themselves.
The majority applied flawed logic to conclude that there was a
legitimate risk of escape that justified the police action. The fact
that one of the suspects was not in the apartment when the po-
lice entered does not mean that the police had an objective basis
before the entry to think that there was an imminent risk of
escape especially when the police did not yet know that the
seller was not in the apartment. Whenever there is an ongoing
criminal activity there is a risk that suspects will temporarily
remove themselves from the premises. But this risk does not al-
ways rise to the level of an emergency. Here, the dealers were
engaged in running an ongoing and profitable business enter-
prise. They had no idea they were being watched and appeared
to be lax in their security. 35 If facts such as these indicate an
objective belief that imminent escape will occur, it is hard to see
when such an emergency will not be deemed to exist. If such an
reason to believe the suspects were in the apartment to be entered. Furthermore, narcot-
ics offenses are considered among the gravest infractions confronting society, and the
police had first hand knowledge that the suspects were engaged in such conduct. Addi-
tionally, the police attempted a peaceful entry before forcing their way into the apart-
ment. Finally, the court held that the risk that a suspect might escape was borne out by
the fact that the individual who actually sold Agee the narcotics was not present in the
apartment when the police entered. MacDonald, 916 F.2d at 770, 773.
It is important to note that risk of escape is the only Dorman factor that corre-
sponds with the justifications for warrantless entries that was put forward by the Olson
Court and prior Supreme Court cases. Because the suspects were unaware of the surveil-
lance, the risk of escape was not of emergency proportions.
135 The Task Force did an exceptionally good job blending into the area. The agents
were of the same racial group as members of the neighborhood. Furthermore, Agent Agee
testified that he did not recognize any of the suspects, nor did they give the slightest
indication of recognizing him. Moreover, even Agee did not recognize the other agent
who shadowed him into the building. Thomas, 893 F.2d at 489. Thus, it is doubtful that
the suspects were aware of that agent's presence. Finally, Agee saw no security devices or
runners that could tip the suspects off to the surveillance. Id.
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analysis is allowed to persist, the rule in favor of obtaining a
warrant before entering a home will become a nullity.
2. Additional Indicia of Exigency
The in banc court did not rely solely on the Dorman factors
to establish the existence of exigent circumstances. It also
looked to see whether there was an imminent risk that evidence
would be lost or destroyed as well as whether there was an im-
minent risk of danger. This examination properly encompasses
the risks that the Supreme Court has found to justify the exi-
gent circumstances exception. However, although the in banc
court correctly framed the analysis, its application of the analyt-
ical framework to the facts reveal serious deficiencies.
The majority concluded that the agents risked losing the ev-
idence had they failed to act immediately. The court based this
conclusion on the existence of the unidentified apartment. This
conclusion is, however, unwarranted because there was no objec-
tive reason to believe the suspects would suddenly transfer their
stash to the other apartment. Mere speculation is not tanta-
mount to reasonable suspicion and should not be sufficient to
assume the presence of exigent circumstances.3 6
A more sensitive analysis of the facts shows that no objec-
tive emergency existed that justified the warrantless entry. The
suspects were unaware of the police presence and gave no indi-
cation that "business as usual" would not continue.1,37 Thus,
there was no reason to believe that this potential transfer of con-
traband would occur. If the exigent circumstances exception is
to remain an exception and not be allowed to swallow the rule,
enforcement agents and reviewing courts will have to apply more
stringent controls on the use of the exception than was evi-
denced in MacDonald.
138 United States v. Munoz-Guerra, 788 F.2d 295 (5th Cir. 1986) ("without reason to
believe that a defendant was aware of police surveillance, mere presence of firearms or
destructible, incriminating contraband did not create exigent circumstances"); United
States v. Morales, 737 F.2d 761 (8th Cir. 1984) (mere fear or apprehension that evidence
may be destroyed did not justify warrantless motel room entry based on exigent
circumstances).
187 In most instances where courts have upheld a warrantless entry based upon fear
of loss of evidence the suspects have been aware of the police presence. See, e.g., United
States v. Cattouse, 846 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1988); United States v. Munoz-Guerra, 788 F.2d
295 (5th Cir. 1986).
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B. Objective Risk of Danger
In MacDonald the Second Circuit shaped a per se rule that
narcotics trafficking always gives rise to an imminent risk of
danger. This rule is based on judicial notice of the violence asso-
ciated with drug trafficking. However, this rule does not require
that there be particularized suspicion that the suspect in any
given case will become violent. Outside the context of the nar-
cotics trade, probable cause to believe a suspect is armed, stand-
ing alone, does not qualify as an exigent circumstance.3 8 The
police must know of some other independent fact that would
lead them to suspect that violence will occur unless they move
in.
The government, in its brief on rehearing in banc, presented
statistics showing the relationship between drug selling and vio-
lence.1 39 There is no escaping the reality that drug trafficking
often results in violence. However, in MacDonald the Second
Circuit has seemingly created an irrebuttable presumption that
all drug trafficking operations may at any time explode into vio-
lence.140 This presumption stands, notwithstanding specific indi-
cations that a particular drug operation is indeed stable.
In MacDonald the police knew before the entry that the op-
eration had been in existence at least four months prior to their
active investigation. During that four-month period there was no
outbreak of violence. Furthermore, during the few hours the po-
lice watched the operation they witnessed a steady stream of
buyers. At no time was there any indication that violence would
erupt. Finally, Agent Agee did not observe any runners, scan-
- See United States v. Munoz-Guerra, 788 F.2d 295 (5th Cir. 1986).
189 The government presented one study that examined 414 randomly selected
homicides in New York City. That study found that 52.7% of these homicides were drug
related. The authors of this study found that the violence was associated with "territorial
disputes among rival dealers, assaults and homicides committed within particular drug
dealing operations in order to enforce normative codes, robberies of drug dealers, elimi-
nation of informers, punishment for selling adulterated or bogus drugs, [and] assaults to
collect drug related debts." Brief for Appellee at 17, MacDonald, 916 F.2d at 766 (No3.
89.1262, 89-1263) (quoting P. GOLDSTrm. BRoWNsTEIN, P. RiAN & T. BEu.ucCL CRAcK
AND HowcmE i N.w YoR CrrT (1988)).
140 Given prior case law, this presumption may even stand when enforcement agents
have no indication that the particular drug dealers are armed. The Second Circuit has
"often... taken judicial notice that, to substantial dealers in narcotics, firearms are as
much tools of the trade as are the most commonly recognized articles of narcotics para-
phernalia." United States v. Crespo, 834 F.2d 267, 271 (2d Cir. 1987) (citations omitted).
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ners, or other security devices. This refutes the inference that
these particular suspects were overly security conscious. When-
ever armed criminals engage in criminal activity, violence may
erupt. The mere fact that suspects are armed, however, does not
rise to the level of an emergency. Furthermore, in the absence of
an emergency situation, the Fourth Amendment puts a premium
on protecting privacy interests as opposed to promoting efficient
law enforcement.
As a result of the court's analysis in this case, the exigent
circumstance exception may be used to justify all warrantless
home entries whenever there is mere probable cause to believe
that an ongoing drug trafficking operation exists. This is a clear
misreading of the scope of the exception. The court's analysis is
tantamount to creating a drug trafficking exception to the war-
rant requirement. The Fourth Amendment allows no such ex-
ception. Rather, the Fourth Amendment demands a case-by-case
adjudication to determine whether an objective emergency com-
pelled the warrantless entry. When, as here, there was no objec-
tive emergency requiring immediate action, the police should
have obtained a warrant. This simple rule should apply even in
drug cases, even when the government is engaged in a war
against drugs.
C. Manufacturing of Exigency
The most chilling aspect of the MacDonald opinion was the
cavalier attitude the majority took to the manufacturing by the
police of the exigent circumstances. 41 The court limited its anal-
ysis in this area to a conclusory statement that subjective intent
is irrelevant to Fourth Amendment analysis as long as police act
in an objectively lawful manner.142 As a result, creative police
officers now have discretion to choreograph events so as to by-
pass the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. This result
conflicts with the underlying policy of the Fourth Amendment,
which is to limit government intrusions.
The Fourth Amendment reflects a "profoundly anti-govern-
1 This alternate holding is even more chilling because it was unnecessary. The
court did not need to reach this issue because it found that exigent circumstances existed
before the agents knocked on the apartment door. See note 25 supra.
14 MacDonald, 916 F.2d at 772.
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ment" vision.143 Historically, it was a response to the colonial
writs of assistance and general warrants.14 It reflects a funda-
mental dissatisfaction with the ability of government officials to
search and seize without restraint. 4 5 The Fourth Amendment,
with its warrant requirement, attempted to limit the excesses of
government power by placing a necessary check on government
actors. By allowing police officers to consciously manipulate
events and sidestep the warrant requirement, the court is em-
powering the police to enter homes without prior judicial re-
view.146 Although it would be hyperbole to suggest that this deci-
sion returns us to the excesses of the colonial period, it is fair to
point out that this decision is an unnecessary step in that
direction.
The majority essentially argues that since a police officer
may lawfully attempt to obtain a consent to enter a home, it is
legitimate for officers to try to get such a consent even if they
know that the attempt will be unsuccessful and give rise to exi-
gent circumstances. 47 This analysis reflects the current trend in
the Second Circuit to retreat from cases like Segura which se-
verely limited law enforcement agents' ability to manufacture
exigent circumstances." 8 Indeed, MacDonald goes far beyond
143 Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 imi. L REv. 349, 353
(1974).
I" See, e.g., Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 481-82 (citing the writs of assistance as
a driving force behind the inclusion of the Fourth Amendment in the Bill of Rights),
reh'g denied, 380 U.S. 926 (1965); United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 US. 56, 69 (1950)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (the Fourth Amendment provides a "safeguard against re-
currence of abuses so deeply felt by the Colonies as to be one of the potent cause3 of the
Revolution"). Both general warrants and writs of assistance permitted unrestrained
searches of homes. The bearer of these warrants and writs were vested with complete
discretion to enter and search private places. See W. LASSoN, THE HISTORY AND Damrop-
METr OF THE FouRTH AsmENLzmN To THE UNrr STATES CoNS=iru oN 51-78 (1937).
25 The colonists had a long history of opposition to the writs. Indeed, James Otis
resigned as Attorney General of lssachusettes to fight the writs. See Fraenkel, Con-
cerning Searches and Seizures, 34 HARv. L. Rav. 361, 361-65 (1921). Otis decried the
writs as "'the worst instrument of arbitrary power, the most destructive of English lib-
erty and the fundamental principles of law.... ."' Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616,
625 (1886) (quoting James Otis). This language helped stir the 1776 Revolution. Otis's
1761 speech in Boston was "perhaps the most prominent event which inaugurated the
resistance of the colonies to the oppressions of the mother country." Id.
146 See generally Jonas, Pretext Searches and the Fourth Amendment: Unconstitu-
tional Abuses of Power, 137 U. PA. L. Rav. 1791 (1989).
14 MacDonald, 916 F.2d at 770-71.
148 Examples of other cases are: United States v. Zabare, 871 F.2d 282 (2d Cir. 1989)
(agents did not impermissibly create exigent circumstances when, as part of an under-
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prior case law by condoning activity designed soIely to manufac-
ture emergencies in order to circumvent the warrant
requirement.
The majority stated that a police officer's subjective intent
should play no role in analyzing whether his or her conduct vio-
lates the Fourth Amendment as long as the conduct is otherwise
lawful.149 The Court relied on Hortonv. California'0 as author-
ity for its holding. In Horton the Court abandoned the inadver-
tence requirement for a valid plain view seizure.16 It held that
"[t]he fact that an officer is interested in an item of evidence
and fully expects to find it in the course of a search should not
invalidate its seizure if the search is confined in area and dura-
tion by the terms of a warrant or a valid exception to the war-
rant requirement."' 52 The Court went on to say, however, that
police officers have no incentive to "deliberately omit a particu-
cover operation directed at scalpers, they "sold" voided tickets to the suspect which was
sure to alert the suspect to the existence of the sting operation and create exigent cir-
cumstances); United States v. Gallo-Roman, 816 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1987) (agents did not
impermissibly create exigent circumstances when they intercepted mailed photographs
that were being used to smuggle cocaine since a controlled delivery was subsequently
made and the suspect was likely to notice that the photographs had been tampered
with); United States v. Martinez-Gonzalez, 686 F.2d 93 (2d Cir. 1982) (agents reasonably
sought to question a suspect outside his doorway and exigent circumstances existed after
the suspect dashed into his apartment).
It is interesting to note that each of these cases can be characterized as ones where
the suspect police behavior was reasonable to further the investigation. MacDonald was
a departure because the behavior of the agents should not as a matter of law be deemed
reasonable. Moreover, unlike in MacDonald, the agents in these cases clearly did not act
solely to circumvent the warrant requirement. However, these cases do demonstrate that
the court is becoming extremely deferential when it comes to judging police practices.
Indeed, these cases condone police conduct that foreseeably gives rise to exigent circum-
stances. Commentators have often criticized courts for validating this kind of police con-
duct. See W. LAFAvE, supra note 109, § 6.1(f), at 600-02 (in planned arrests, agents
should provide for all foreseeable consequences'of the planned aspect of the operation).
MacDonald can be seen as a culmination and extension of cases denigrating the impor.
tance of foreseeability in exigent circumstances analysis.
149 MacDonald, 916 F.2d at 772.
150 110 S. Ct. 2301 (1990).
I1 Under the plain view doctrine a police officer who is lawfully on the premises
may seize an item in plain view without a warrant if its incriminating character is imme-
diately apparent to the officer. Prior to Horton, the discovery of an item in plain view
needed to be inadvertent. In other words, if the officer expected to find and seize the
item, it did not fall within the plain view doctrine and could not be seized without a
warrant. See Horton, 110 S. Ct. at 2303; Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443
(1971).
15 Horton, 110 S. Ct. at 2309.
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lar description of the item to be seized from the application for a
search warrant."15 Indeed, the Court stated that "'[o]nly over-
sight or careless mistake would explain the omission in the war-
' 11154rant application ....
Using Horton as an analogy, the majority stated, "the fact
that the agent may be 'interested' in having the occupants react
in a way that provides exigent circumstances and may 'fully ex-
pect' such a reaction does not invalidate action that is otherwise
lawful." 155 This analysis, however, ignores the fact that the of-
ficers in MacDonald had a clear incentive to trigger the exigent
circumstances-the desire to circumvent the warrant require-
ment. By failing to examine the agents' subjective intent, the
MacDonald court broadened the discretion of law enforcement
agents to enter homes without obtaining a warrant. This stands
in stark contrast to Horton, where a failure to examine the of-
ficers' state of mind can be justified by the lack of any police
motivation to abuse the warrant process.
This approach to the manufacturing by the police of exigent
circumstances can be seen as an extension of cases like United
States v. Cattouse.156 In Cattouse the court held that the police
did not impermissibly create exigent circumstances when they
sent an all-white undercover team into a black and Hispanic
neighborhood to stake out a suspected drug dealer.57 In that
case, the police justified their warrantless entry by claiming that
there was imminent risk of escape and destruction of evidence
because the suspects could have easily detected the surveillance
team. 
58
The defendant unsuccessfully argued that because the exi-
gent circumstances were foreseeable the police should not have
been able to invoke the exigent circumstances exception. The
defendant relied on Segura, arguing that the police may not
willfully create exigent circumstances. The Cattouse court dis-
tinguished Segura, holding that the investigatory technique the
police used was reasonable and not designed to create exigent
153 Id.
Id. at 2309 n.9. (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 617 (1971)
(White, J., dissenting)).
15 MacDonald, 916 F.2d at 772 (citing Horton, 110 S. Ct. at 2309).
1256 846 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1988).




circumstances. 159 As a result, even though the emergency was
foreseeable, because the agents did not engage in the behavior
for the purpose of manufacturing the exigency, a warrantless en-
try was justified. Thus, although the court was extremely defer-
ential when reviewing the appropriateness of sending an all-
white surveillance team,6 0 it implicitly used a subjective stan-
dard to condone the police activity. The negative implication of
Cattouse was that if the police employ an investigatory tech-
nique for the sole purpose of creating exigencies, a warrantless
entry will not be upheld.'
159 Id. at 147-48. Even this holding is open to criticism. In Cattouse the police
planned a substantial controlled buy of narcotics. The police had probable cause to ar-
rest the suspect before the "buy" and thus could have obtained a warrant. However, the
police failed to do so. After the "buy" was completed, the agents entered the suspect's
apartment because they feared the suspect would destroy the prerecorded money. This
fear was based on the fact that the surveillance team was all white, and the observed
neighborhood was predominantly black. The court upheld the warrantless entry. Cat-
touse, 846 F.2d 144, 148 (2d Cir. 1988).
The defendant in Cattouse argued that because the investigatory technique
foreseeably gave rise to exigent circumstances, the police should have been required to
obtain a warrant before commencing the "buy." Id. Although this argument did not win
the day, it does find support among commentators. Professor LaFave makes the distinc-
tion between planned police activity and unplanned investigations. When an operation is
planned, the police should not be able to justify a warrantless entry based on exigent
circumstances where the exigencies are foreseeable. Professor LaFave argues that this
limitation is necessary to insure against the deliberate manufacture of exigencies through
planned surveillance or police delay tactics. W. LAFAvE, supra note 109, § 6.1(f), at 600-
02.
Although the MacDonald court spent little time examining this aspect of exigent
circumstances, it did allude to the fact that the possibility of the loss of the prerecorded
five dollar bill may have justified the warrantless entry. MacDonald, 916 F.2d at 770.
This scenario is analogous to what transpired in Cattouse. The police had probable cause
to arrest before they undertook the controlled buy. Furthermore, the prospect of losing
the prerecorded bill was foreseeable. Thus, under Professor LaFave's approach, the po-
lice should have obtained a warrant before commencing the undercover buy.
110 The court found that an all-white surveillance team in a black neighborhood is a
reasonable investigatory tool. The Cattouse court suggested that although it would not
demand that officers justify all reasonable activity that gives rise to exigent circum-
stances, it would not sanction unreasonable activity that gives rise to exigent circum-
stances. Although the court did not articulate a clear definition of reasonable or unrea-
sonable behavior it seemed to focus on the subjective intent of the agent. Had the
Cattouse court thought that the agents chose an all-white surveillance team purpose-
fully, when African American and Hispanic agents were readily available, in order to
create exigent circumstances, it would have invalidated the warrantless search. However,
absent evidence of bad faith the Court would not second-guess police procedure.
161 Thus, MacDonald is quite a jump from cases like Cattouse. In MacDonald the
court suggested that even if the police intentionally engage in conduct in order to manu-
facture exigencies, they can still invoke the exception. MacDonald, 916 F.2d at 770-71.
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MacDonald reflects a thorough retreat on the part of the
Second Circuit from the rule first announced in Segura. Indeed,
the court effectively overruled Segura in this case.10 2 The court
will no longer examine the purpose behind police activity that
tends to give rise to exigent circumstances. As long as the police
do not violate any law, they may engage in any activity for the
sole purpose of sidestepping the warrant requirement. This rule
unnecessarily creates incentives for the police to abandon the
warrant requirement. If the court actually follows the approach
announced in MacDonald there will be little left of the warrant
requirement for home entries in this circuit.
After MacDonald, all the police need to enter a suspect's
home without a warrant is probable cause. Armed with probable
cause, the police may go to the suspect's home and identify
themselves as police officers. The occupants have two options.
They may invite the officers in or refuse to allow entry. If they
invite the officer in, they are by definition relinquishing their
privacy rights. On the other hand, if they refuse to open their
home to the police, they leave themselves open to the prospect
of a forcible entry since the police can claim that exigent cir-
cumstances exist.16 This rule does not lend itself to the serious
162 MacDonald, 916 F.2d at 772.
I This is the exact dilemma the court tried to avoid in United States v. Reed. 572
F.2d 412 (2d Cir. 1978). In that case, agents knocked on the suspects' door and identified
themselves. Although there was probable cause, the police had not obtained a warrant.
Furthermore, there were no exigent circumstances that would have justified a warrant-
less entry had they not identified themselves. The court in that case noted:
We do not believe that the fact that Reed opened the door to her apartment in
response to the knock of three armed federal agents operated in such a way as
to eradicate her Fourth Amendment privacy interest. To hold otherwise would
be to present occupants with an unfair dilemma, to say the least-either open
the door and thereby forfeit cherished privacy interests or refuse to open the
door and thereby run the risk of creating the appearance of an "exigency" suf-
ficient to justify a forcible entry. This would hardly seem fair in situations that
present no exigent circumstances in the first place.
Id. at 423 n.9 (citations omitted).
The implication in Reed was that the mere refusal to open one's door to agents will
trigger exigent circumstances when probable cause exists. Thus, the purest of verbal re-
fusals, without other indicia of exigency, e.g., flushing toilets or scurrying feet, may be
sufficient justification for agents to claim exigency. Indeed, this conclusion is borne out
by the case law. In Cattouse, 846 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1988), the agents justified their war-
rantless entry by arguing that there was a high probability that the suspects would de-
tect them and either escape or destroy the evidence. Id. at 148. That fact alone justified
the warrantless search. Here, the danger is just as great. Indeed, the emergency is of an
even greater magnitude because the suspects know for certain that agents are investigat-
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business of protecting people's privacy interests in the same way
as interposing a neutral magistrate between the police and the
citizen.
Although the driving force behind the, court's abandonment
of the rule against manufacturing exigent circumstances seems
to be the underlying narcotics offense, this approach is not lim-
ited to narcotics.1 4 Rather, this new rule can be employed by
police whenever they have probable cause to enter a person's
home. As a result, the warrant requirement will become mere
verbiage, protection without substance.165
CONCLUSION
In order to more fully serve the purpose of the Fourth
Amendment the Second Circuit must completely revamp its exi-
gent circumstances analysis. To begin with, the court should re-
frain from employing the Dorman factors in its analysis. The
limitations of the standard demand that a more effective test be
used. The test suggested in Olson should replace the old stan-
dard. It has the benefit of not atomizing the analysis while pin-
pointing all the risks that justify warrantless entries. Further-
more, when applying the Olson test, the court should engage in a
particularized analysis. It should not rely on mere generalities
regarding the propensity of violence associated with drug crimes
ing them. Once the agents identify themselves it is fairly simple to argue that they have
objective reason to believe that exigent circumstances exist.
164 As long as the underlying crime is serious, any time the police have probable
cause to enter a person's home, they may identify themselves in order to trigger exigent
circumstances. See Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984) (exigent circumstances can-
not justify a warrantless entry where the underlying offense is not serious). If there is a
risk that the supect will escape, destroy evidence or become violent, the agents may ef-
fect a warrantless entry. Narcotics are not the only type of contraband that may be
easily destroyed. See, e.g., Zabare, 871 F.2d at 282 (counterfeit tickets). Furthermore,
narcotics dealers are not the only individuals prone to violence nor are they the only
suspects who attempt to escape.
'l This will be unfortunate, because the warrant process does offer both concrete
and symbolic protection. For a good discussion of the value of the warrant process see
White, The Fourth Amendment as a Way of Talking About People: A Study of Robin-
son and Matlock, 1974 Sup. CT. RIv. 165, 182 n.34 (This article lists four factors which
favor the warrant requirement. first, it freezes the affiant's story before the search or
seizure; second, to the extent magistrates are independent, certain impermissible intru-
sions will be prevented; third, even if the magistrate is not entirely independent, he or
she still has a valid function to play by ensuring that at least the particularity require-
ment of the warrant clause is met; and finally, to require the police to obtain a warrant is
to remain at least one symbolic step away from a police state.).
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to establish exigent circumstances. Finally, the court should re-
think its alternate holding and forbid police to engage in con-
duct whose sole purpose is to trigger an emergency.
Jacqueline Bryks

